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Monitoring the Moqtada al-Sadr Factor

March 19, 2007 7:57 AM

Anthony Cordesman, an ABC News consultant and the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies blogs:

There are many things that can go wrong in Iraq and rapidly change the news story there. No single issue, however, is now more likely to produce a major near-term change than Moqtada al-Sadr.

The present US strategy in Baghdad and Iraq depends on Sadr being largely passive, at least in terms of supporting or encouraging major military clashes with the US using the Mahdi militia in Baghdad, in the shrine cities in the South, and/or in Basra and the four provinces in the Southeast.

If Sadr or the bulk of his militia leaders force the issue in any of these areas, the US will need to make major troop redeployments and the entire "surge" strategy will come into question.

So far, it is not clear that this will ever happen. Sadr does periodically reassert his verbal opposition to the US presence in Iraq. He has never accepted the surge strategy or public need for US troops. He had never agreed to stand down the Mahdi Army. He had, however, stood by as the US and Iraqi governments have arrested some of the most extreme elements in his militia.

Like other Shi'ite leaders he has seemed to take the stand that the US will help the Shi'ite-led government take control of Baghdad, never force them into full equity in dealing with the Sunnis, fail to disarm the militias that remain quiet or disperse, and then eventually leave -- putting the Shi'ite squarely in charge. In short, he has seemed to take the position he can let the US do much of his fighting, watch it leave within a year of so, and win the power struggle that follows.

He may, however, be watching a challenge emerge from his followers and some key leaders under him. As the Where Things Stand series reveals, large numbers of Shi'ite now oppose the US presence. The situation in Baghdad is deteriorating, particularly economic conditions for the poor in areas like Sadr City. The "surge" has made the militias stand down without providing an immediate replacement for them in security terms. The end result is pressure within the Sadr movement for resistance and for action in spite of what Sadr may want. At the same time, some Sadr followers have found that the US can provide aid, is gradually building security, and seem willing to deal with the US in spite of the movement’s radicals.

Furthermore, Sadr's lack of visibility may be creating stronger rivals and dissidents within his movement, not only in Baghdad but Basra and elsewhere. It is one thing to sit aside and fight a propaganda and religious battle when it seems likely to produce victory. It is another to see rival rise, part of the movement become more actively radical than Sadr wants, and see others collaborate with the US surge.

As the last few days have shown, this creates the possibility -- although not yet the probability -- of an explosion where Sadr feels forced to confront the US and the surge. If this happens, violence and casualties could zoom with little warning; the prospects for Iraqi conciliation would decline, and the risk of more infighting in the Shi'ite coalition would be a near certainty.

In short, a "Sadr watch" is a key priority. With luck, things won't go sour. Luck, however, has not always been on the US side.

March 19, 2007 | Permalink | Share | User Comments (0)

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