« Previous | Main | Next »

Prospects for Iraq’s Stability?

August 23, 2007 2:49 PM

Following the release of the National Intelligence Estimate, Anthony Cordesman, an ABC News consultant and the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies blogs about the road ahead:

The NIE misses five critical developments in the fighting which negate many of the gains cited in the NIE. These developments have been almost totally ignored by President Bush and a number of Congressmen returning from Iraq:

1. The focus on defeating Al Qa’ida has created more opportunities for Shi'ite sectarian cleansing in virtually every part of the sectarian fault line, including Baghdad and the Ring. This is not measured in a surge of violent attacks or killings. It is measured in a steady growth of Shi'ite controlled territory, displacement of Sunnis, and Sadr Militia control and sale/rental of properties and housing. In some ways, the surge is winning the battle for sectarian cleansing.

2. Significant elements of the Iraqi Army, National Police, and regular police have taken the Shi'ite side and backed Sadrist, with the support of important elements in the Prime Minister's office, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of the Interior. The sectarian problems in virtually every aspect of the Iraqi security effort have been notably worse than was previously estimated.

3. The Iraqi government has lost control over much of the south to feuding Shi'ite factions, and the US and Iraqi security forces cannot play a role to replace departing British forces. The British are now down to three token enclaves in the Basra area. The four Southeastern provinces -- where oil exports account for 80% of Iraq's oil exports and most of its total exports and government income -- are the scene of feuding between the Sadrists, SIIC, Faddilla, and al Dawa. These religious movements are struggling for money and power in a form closer to criminal gangs than religious or political groups and even their leaders in Baghdad have limited control over them. The provinces of Najaf and Karbala are more secure but scarcely supporters of the US. Even US aid efforts like the PRTs are largely excluded from operating in them.

4. Kurdish-Arab Sectarian tension remains a major problem. Overt violence is limited but efforts at ethnic cleansing continue and Shi'ite militias are building up their presence in the North.

5. The Sunni tribal alignment is uncertain and volatile. Being anti-Al Qa’ida is not being pro-government. If political progress does not take place, central government money does not go to the tribes and Sunnis, and local security forces are not officially recognized and tied into the police, all of the progress to date could reverse or make the US act as the sponsor of the tribes and a buffer between it and the government.

6. The Shi'ite militia are growing in power, strength, wealth, and Iranian support. The US and ISF are attacking some of the worst and most violent elements of the Sadr militia, but in broad terms, the Shi'ite militias continue to expand; infiltrate into Iraqi force (especially the police); and raise money through extortion, theft, expropriation of property, and gang action. Iran continues to build them up with weapons and training.

August 23, 2007 | Permalink | User Comments (0)

TrackBack

TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.typepad.com/t/trackback/433071/21046537

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Prospects for Iraq’s Stability?:

User Comments

Post a comment

Name:

Email Address:

URL:

Remember personal info?

Comments: